Harnessing the Forces of Urban Expansion - The Public Economics of Farmland Development Allowance

For decades, rapid urban expansion has led to concerns over the loss of cultivated land in rural China. This contrasts sharply with another salient feature of the Chinese land policy reform landscape that has gone on largely unnoticed - the addition of newly cultivated land in China through land development has consistently exceeded land conversion. In a model featuring fiscal decentralization, local governments as custodians of land use and development, along with a land development allowance policy instituted in 1998, we show that a land development allowance policy can harness the forces of urban expansion to encourage agricultural land development.land development allowance, fiscal decentralization, inter-jurisdictional competition, agricultural development, Community/Rural/Urban Development, H11, H77, P35, R5, R14, O18,

Two Steps Forward and Three Steps Back: The "Cliff Effect" - Colorado's Curious Penalty for Increased Earnings

Simply being employed does not mean economic self-sufficiency for women in Colorado. In fact, it may actually work against them. Currently in Colorado, public assistance for the working poor isn't designed to allow women the opportunity to incrementally increase their wages to work toward self-sufficiency. In fact, as a family's earnings increase and they rise above the official poverty level, they begin to lose eligibility for tax credits, childcare subsidies, health care coverage and food stamps even though they are not yet self-sufficient. So although parents may be working and earning more, their families can't reach financial security. This is called the Cliff Effect, and it results in many women refusing pay increases, forcing them to live a life of dependence. We conducted groundbreaking research to learn more about the causes of the Cliff Effect and lay the groundwork for solutions

DISENTANGLING THE PRODUCTION AND EXPORT CONSEQUENCES OF DIRECT FARM INCOME PAYMENTS

This paper formalizes the production and export consequences of direct farm payments. Taxpayer financed direct payments distort exit and production incentives, while consumer financed subsidies also imply that the risks of domestic and export production differ. Welfare decompostion and empirical calibration illustrate the potential for import barriers to cross-subsidize exports.Agricultural and Food Policy, International Relations/Trade,

Middlemen, Non-Profits, and Poverty

In many markets in developing countries, especially in remote areas, middlemen are thought to earn excessive profits. Non-profits come in to counter what is seen as middlemen's market power, and rich country consumers pay a "fair-trade" premium for products marketed by such non-profits. This paper provides answers to the following five questions. How exactly do middlemen and non-profits divide up the market? How do the price mark up and price pass-through differ between middleman and non-profits? What is the impact of non-profits entry on the wellbeing of the poor? Should the government subsidize the entry of non-profits, or the entry of middlemen? Should wealthy consumers in the North pay a premium for fair trade products, or should they support fair trade non-profits directly?poverty, non-profits, middlemen, market access

Middlemen, Non-Profits, and Poverty

In many markets in developing countries, especially in remote areas, middlemen are thought to earn excessive profits. Non-profits come in to counter what is seen as middlemen's market power, and rich country consumers pay a "fair-trade" premium for products marketed by such non-profits. This paper provides answers to the following five questions. How exactly do middlemen and non-profits divide up the market? How do the price mark up and price pass-through differ between middleman and non-profits? What is the impact of non-profits entry on the wellbeing of the poor? Should the government subsidize the entry of non-profits, or the entry of middlemen? Should wealthy consumers in the North pay a premium for fair trade products, or should they support fair trade non-profits directly?Middlemen, Non-profits, Poverty, Market Access, Food Security and Poverty, International Development, Productivity Analysis, F15, I32, L3,

Tax Evasion, Minimum Wage Non-Compliance and Informality

We study the impact of tax and minimum wage reforms on the incidence of informality. To gauge the incidence of informality, we use measures of the extent of tax evasion, the extent of minimum wage non-compliance, and the size of the informal workforce. Our approach allows us to examine (i) the distinction between determinants of firm-level reported wage distribution and actual wage distribution, (ii) the complementarity of tax and minimum wage enforcement, (iii) the impact that a minimum wage reform has on tax and minimum wage compliance, and (iv) the impact that a tax policy reform has on tax and minimum wage compliance. We conclude with the design of optimal minimum wage and tax policies (even in the complete absence of minimum wage enforcement). We do so based on two objectives derived from popular concerns associated with an unchecked expansion of informality: tax revenue maximization, and poverty alleviation among workers.poverty, flat tax reform, minimum wage reform, tax evasion, informality

Contractual Dualism, Market Power and Informality

Two stylized representations are often found in the academic and policy literature on informality and formality in developing countries. The first is that the informal (or unregulated) sector is more competitive than the formal (or regulated) sector. The second is that contract enforcement is easier in the formal sector than in the informal sector, precisely because the formal sector comes under the purview of state regulation. The basic contention of this paper is that these two representations are not compatible with each other. We develop a search-theoretic model of contractual dualism in the labor market where the inability to commit to contracts in the informal sector leads to employer market power in equilibrium, while an enforced minimum wage in the formal sector provides employers with a commitment technology but which reduces their market power in equilibrium. The contributions of this paper are three-fold. It (i) provides the micro-underpinnings for endogenous determination of employer market power in the formal and informal sectors due to contractual dualism in the two sectors, (ii) offers a unified and coherent setup whereby a host of salient features of developing country labor markets can be explained together, and (iii) places the original Stiglerian prescription of the optimal (unemployment minimizing) minimum wage in the broader context of labor markets where formal job creation is costly, and where formal employment, informal employment, and unemployment co-exist.contractual dualism, wage dualism, employer market power, informality

On Footloose Industries, Asymmetric Information, and Wage Bargaining

WP 2003-34 October 2003JEL Classification Codes: F2; J5; D8If capital becomes internationally mobile but labor does not, is the bargaining outcome for workers worsened? In this paper we show that the answer to this question depends critically on the information structure of the bargaining process. In particular, we demonstrate a hitherto under appreciated information role of capital mobility in determining the distribution of output between workers and employers. In doing so we bring together three strands of literature that are not often seen together--incentive compatible contracting, union-employer bargaining, and the consequences of capital mobility

Ethnic Fragmentation, Conflict, Displaced Persons and Human Trafficking: An Empirical Analysis

Ethnic conflicts and their links to international human trafficking have recently received a surge in international attention. It appears that ethnic conflicts exacerbate the internal displacement of individuals from networks of family and community, and their access to economic and social safety nets. These same individuals are then vulnerable to being trafficked by the hopes of better economic prospects elsewhere. In this paper, we empirically examine this link between ethnic fragmentation, conflicts, internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees and international trafficking, making use of a novel dataset of international trafficking. We conduct a direct estimation, which highlights the ultimate impact of ethnic fragmentation and conflict on international trafficking through internal and international displacements.ethnic fragmentation, conflict, displaced persons, human trafficking

Transnational Trafficking, Law Enforcement and Victim Protection: A Middleman Trafficker's Perspective

We explore three hitherto poorly understood characteristics of the human trafficking market – the cross-border ease of mobility of traffickers, the relative bargaining strength of traffickers and final buyers, and the elasticity of buyers' demand. In a model of two-way bargaining, the exact configuration of these characteristics is shown to determine whether domestic and foreign crackdowns on illicit employment mutually reinforce or counteract one another in efforts to stem the tide of trafficking. Estimation results from a gravity model of trafficking present evidence consistent with the mutual reinforcement view, indicating considerable ease of mobility, partial bargaining power, and inelastic demand.human trafficking, two-way Nash bargaining, victim protection, law enforcement